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Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr. is a partner in the Boston law firm of Morgan, Brown & 
Joy, a firm exclusively devoted to the practice of labor and employment law representing 
management.  
 
 
Throughout his career, Mr. DiGiovanni has specialized in representing institutions of 
higher education on labor and employment matters and is counsel to numerous 
institutions in the Northeast, including Harvard University, Brandeis University, Tufts 
University, the University of Vermont, University System of New Hampshire, 
Providence College and Rutgers, among many others.   
 
His work has included the negotiations of numerous faculty and staff collective 
bargaining agreements for various colleges and universities, and representation of 
institutions in arbitration, agency hearings and court proceedings. 
 
He is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Association of College and 
University Attorneys and is a frequent speaker on labor relations and employment law 
issues. 
 
Mr. DiGiovanni holds a B.A. (summa cum laude) from Providence College (1970) and 
received his J.D. from Cornell University Law School in 1973. 
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The Sea Change at the NLRB 
 
We live in odd times in the world of labor relations. On the one hand, the past 
year has seen a Republican resurgence in Congress, the final collapse of the Employee 
Free Choice Act- at least for now - and the stunning roll back of public sector labor rights 
in several states around the country. In this climate, it is hard to think of too many bright 
spots for labor. But clearly if there is one, it is centered in Washington at the National 
Labor Relations Board. 
Since President Obama’s 2010 appointments of three new members to the 
National Labor Relations Board, the Board has shown a decided shift in its agenda 
towards a more pro-union stance.  Recent NLRB decisions, advisories, rulemaking and 
other signals, as well as speeches by Board Members, all indicate that the Board is clearly 
taking steps to change the legal landscape surrounding the National Labor Relations Act 
in a manner which would be favorable towards unions. 
The current Board’s makeup includes Board Chair Wilma Liebman (D) (term 
ends August 2011); Mark Pearce (D) (term ends August 27, 2013) and Brian Hayes(R) 
(term ends September 16, 2012).   Member Craig Becker (D), serving on a recess 
appointment until the end of 2011, has not yet been confirmed by the Senate for a full 
term. In January of this year, the President nominated lawyer Terence Flynn to the Board, 
but he has not yet been confirmed yet, and thus the Board stands today with a 3-1 
Democratic majority. If not yet at full strength, the Board is large enough again to issue 
consequential decisions that will alter previous pro-employer rulings.
1
 
The new Board is going to leave its mark on the labor law landscape through 
three primary methods: 1) case law, including revisiting and possibly reversing Bush 
Board precedent; 2) General Counsel memoranda and guidance and 3) rule making. 
 
 First, the case law front: There is little doubt that the Obama Board, led by Board 
Chair Wilma Liebman, will reconsider many cases decided during the Bush era, and 
                                                 
1
 In a 5-4 ruling issued on June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court held that a two-member National Labor 
Relations Board lacked authority to issue rulings. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,  -- US --, 130 S.Ct. 
2635 (2010)  Writing for the Court majority, Justice Stevens interpreted the quorum requirements of 
Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act as mandating three participating members “at all times” in 
order for the Board to act.  Thus, the Board could not delegate authority to decide cases with only two 
Board members.  
Between January 1, 2008 and March 27, 2010, Members Leibman and Schaumber became the only sitting 
members of the Board.  During this period, the two members decided almost 600 cases based on a 
delegation of authority issued on December 27, 2007, when the Board consisted of four members.  (Two 
recess appointments expired on December 31, 2007.)   However, they were careful not to issue rulings that 
fundamentally changed prior case law to any significant degree.  Such impediments are now gone.  
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undoubtedly will reverse many of those rulings. Indeed, the Board has already taken steps 
in this direction over the past year, with more to come. 
 
 
 
Case Law: Reconsideration of Earlier Precedent  
 
As noted last year, there are many areas where it was anticipated that the new 
Board would seek cases to reverse prior Bush era rulings. Some examples of key 
decisions that might be subject to reconsideration included: 
 
 
1. Brown University 342 NLRB No. 42, 175 LRRM 1089 (2004) where the 
Board, in a 3-2 decision, reversed its decision in New York University, 332 NLRB No. 
111 (2000) and held that graduate students working as teaching assistants or research 
assistants are not employees covered by the Act. The Board majority held that such 
individuals “have a predominantly academic rather than economic relationship with their 
school.”  
 
 2. Oakwood Healthcare Center, Inc., 348 NLRB 686 (2006), the NLRB clarified 
its stance on when an individual is deemed a “supervisor” and thus excluded from the 
coverage of the Act and provided a liberal interpretation of who would qualify as a 
supervisor. Labor contends that many individuals who have marginal authority have been 
denied the right to organize under this decision. 
 
3. IBM Corp., 341 NLRB No. 148 (June 9, 2004), where the Board reversed 
Epilepsy Foundation.  In IBM Corporation, the Board decided that the precedent of 
Epilepsy Foundation should be overruled, and, by a 3-2 majority, the Board concluded 
that the Weingarten rights do not extend to a workplace where employees are not 
represented by a union.   
 
4. The Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), where the Board held that 
employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s email system, and thus, an 
employer could regulate its use by prohibiting employee use of the system for non-job 
related solicitation. In that case, even though employees used the email system for 
personal communication, a rule banning its use for solicitation was still deemed 
appropriate as long as it was not discriminatorily enforced. 
 
The dissent argued that email was the virtual lunch room of the 21
st
 century and that 
any restrictions on employee use of the system for union solicitation, especially when 
personal use was allowed should be presumptively discriminatory and illegal under the 
long line of cases dealing with employee solicitation. 
 
5. Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 NLRB 906 (2004), where the Board held 
that when supervisory pro-union activity is objectionable conduct when it interferes in the 
freedom of choice so as to materially affect the election outcome. It also held that 
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supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards is inherently coercive absent 
mitigating circumstances. The majority opinion said that the Board would look to 
whether the supervisory conduct was generally interfering with employee free choice, 
and, secondly, whether such conduct interfered with freedom of choice to the extent it 
materially affected the election outcome.  
 
The dissent contended that supervisory solicitation of union cards should not be 
inherently coercive, even when the person is unaware that he or she is a true statutory 
supervisor or where that status is unclear.  Also, the dissent would look at such cases in 
the total context of the employer’s anti-union campaign. 
 
6. Tradesmen International, 338 NLRB 460 (2002) There are numerous Board 
cases in which employer work rules are scrutinized to determine whether or not they 
interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collective activity. At issue in 
Tradesman was whether the following employer rules would “reasonably chill employees 
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights”:  (1) prohibition of disloyal, disruptive, 
competitive or damaging conduct; (2) prohibition of slanderous or detrimental 
statements; (3) requirement that employees represent the employer in a positive manner. 
 
The Board held that these rules did not violate the Act because they serve a legitimate 
business purpose and reasonable employees would not construe such rules as intended to 
proscribe Section 7 activity. The dissent thought otherwise, arguing that such rules do 
chill employees in organizing and coming together for collective action to improve the 
workplace.  The dissent would require an employer to specifically state that such rules do 
not include Section 7 activity. 
  
 7. Dana Corporation and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, 
and Agricultural Implement Workers, 351 NLRB No. 28 (9-29-07), where the Board 
modified its recognition bar doctrine in cases where the union’s original majority status 
was based on a card check rather than a Board-supervised election. In the case of Board 
supervised secret ballot elections, no Board election can be held in the bargaining unit for 
at least 12 months following the election. But in cases where an employer voluntarily 
recognizes a union, the rules barring a decertification petition had been less clear. Under 
prior law, an employer’s voluntary recognition of a union in good faith and based on a 
demonstrated majority status immediately bars an election petition filed by an employee 
or by a rival union “for a reasonable period of time.” Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 
NLRB 583 (1966). Any collective bargaining agreement negotiated during this insulated 
period bars Board elections for up to three years of the contract’s term. 
 
In Dana, the Board said it will strike a balance between the interest of employee 
free choice and the promotion of stable labor relations. It established a policy that no 
election bar will be imposed after a voluntary card check agreement unless 1) employees 
in the unit are given notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days, to file a 
decertification petition; 2) 45 days pass from the date of notice without the filing of a 
petition. Thus, unlike Board supervised elections, in cases where there is a card check 
recognition, disgruntled employees, or rival unions, who wish to file a decertification 
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may immediately do so within a 45 day window period. Once that period passes, 
however, the union’s majority status will be irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable 
period of time to enable the parties to engage in negotiations for a first collective 
bargaining agreement. Once any such agreement is reached, such a contract will further 
bar elections for up to three years. 
 
 
 
Already being reconsidered 
 
 The Board has already waded into the waters of reconsideration in several cases 
and is likely to do more in the months ahead. Some examples: 
 
 
1. Dana Corporation.  
 
In Rite Aid Store, #647 and Lamons Gasket Co, No. 16-RD-15976 the Board 
majority agreed to revisit Dana Corp.  The Board sent out an invitation to file briefs to 
interested parties and is now considering the case of Lamons Gasket Company in light of 
such filings. At some point in the next year, the Board will undoubtedly issue a new 
ruling on the subject of when a union voluntarily recognized by management may be 
challenged through a decertification petition. 
 
 
2. Brown University 
Probably the least surprising event of the past year was the Board’s decision to 
revisit Brown. Thus, on October 25, 2010 the NLRB in a 2-1 decision reversed a regional 
director’s dismissal of a union’s petition which sought a vote on union representation for 
graduate teaching and research assistants. New York University, 356 NLRB 7 (2010). 
Through this recent decision, the NLRB stopped short of overruling its 2004 decision in 
Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which held that graduate assistants were not 
employees under the NLRA.  However, the Board majority of Members Becker and 
Pearce did state that there are “compelling reasons” to reconsider the Brown University 
decision.  The Board noted that those reasons included: 1) the contention by the 
Petitioner that the Brown case was based on policy considerations extrinsic to labor law 
and thus not properly considered in determining whether graduate students are 
employees; 2) that the Petitioner offered to submit evidence of prior collective bargaining 
experience in higher education and expert testimony demonstrating that, even giving 
weight to the factors cited in Brown, the graduate students are appropriately classified as 
employees; and 3) that the Brown decision was incompatible with Supreme Court rulings 
on the definition of an employee under the Act.  
 Member Hayes dissented, noting that the Petitioner made no offer or claim that 
there were any facts at all that would distinguish the individuals sought by its petition 
with those found not to be statutory employees in Brown.  The request, Hayes noted, 
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“does nothing more than ask that a Board, with changed membership, view precisely the 
same evidence and argument considered by a prior Board but reach an opposite result. 
This is not a proper basis for reconsideration.”  
This decision signals a potential change in the Board’s position on who are 
considered to be “employees” covered by the NLRA. 
While the full effect of this decision is not yet entirely clear, it does indicate that 
the Board may be inclined to broaden the context of who is considered an “employee” 
under the NLRA.  With this decision, the NLRB laid the foundation for the potential 
reversal of the Brown University decision by remanding the case to the region in order to 
develop a full evidentiary record.  Once the Board has this full record, it may then have 
the necessary support to fully reverse the prior precedent and to thereby expand the 
current scope of NLRA covered employees.  
3. Hacienda Resort Hotel & Casino, 355 NLRB No. 154 (2010): Can Dues Check off be 
Stopped after Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement? 
 
 In this case, the Board dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint that dealt with 
the unilateral cessation of dues check off following the expiration of a collective 
bargaining agreement. While the right of the employer to unilaterally cease such check 
off following contract expiration has been understood for decades,
2
 it had been revisited 
in this case and the Ninth Circuit, in dealing with an earlier appeal, had instructed the 
Board to articulate a rationale as to why the dues check off issue was in a separate 
category from other terms and conditions of employment and thus could be exempt from 
the unilateral change doctrine articulated in NLRB v. Katz 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Under 
that doctrine, most contractual terms and conditions of employment must be maintained, 
as a matter of law, after contract expiration as part of the status quo. 
 
 Upon remand, however, there were only four sitting members of the Board 
(Member Becker had to recuse himself because of prior associations with the parties) and 
the four of them deadlocked on the issue. Because of this even split, the Board had to 
dismiss the complaint. However, the two opposing camps expressed their contrary views 
on the subject. 
 
 Chairman Liebman and Pearce would have changed past policy on this issue. 
They wrote: 
 
We concur in the dismissal of the complaint. We write separately to express our 
substantial doubts about the validity of Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 NLRB 1500, 
1502 (1962), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Marine & Shipbuilding 
Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1963), and its progeny, particularly 
as applied in right-to-work states, where the collective-bargaining agreement 
                                                 
2
 Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 NLRB 1500, 1502 (1962), remanded on other grounds sub 
nom. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1963), 
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contains no union-security clause. As explained more fully in the dissenting 
opinion in Hacienda I, the Board has never provided an adequate statutory or 
policy justification for the holding in Bethlehem Steel excluding dues-check off 
from the unilateral change doctrine articulated in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 
743 (1962). Further, even assuming that Bethlehem Steel was correctly decided, 
the Board has never provided a reasoned analysis for applying the holding in 
Bethlehem Steel in a right-to-work context where dues check off could not 
lawfully be linked with union security arrangements. 
  
On the other hand, Members Hayes and Schaumber would uphold the case law that was 
established fifty years earlier and allow an employer to cease dues check off after the 
expiration of the contract. They wrote: 
 
Unlike our colleagues, however, we respectfully maintain that application of the 
Board rule regarding post-contract expiration of the dues check off obligation is 
warranted for important legal, policy and equitable reasons…. 
There is a major distinction to be made between terms and conditions subject to 
the Katz rule and the exceptions to that rule. The exceptions, including check off, 
are uniquely of a contractual nature. In other words, provisions relating to wages, 
pension and welfare benefits, hours, working conditions, and numerous other 
mandatory bargaining subjects typically appear in a collective-bargaining 
agreement, but those aspects of employment can exist from the commencement of 
a bargaining relationship. The obligation to maintain them does not arise with or 
depend on the existence of a contract.  On the other hand, the obligation to check 
off dues, refrain from strikes or lockouts, and submit grievances to arbitration 
cannot exist in a bargaining relationship until the parties affirmatively contract to 
be so bound. 
 
In light of the deadlock and the fact that it is a tradition of the Board not to overrule 
precedent without a three member majority, existing precedent had to be followed in this 
case, leading to the dismissal of the complaint. 
 
 While this case did not change precedent, it is now clear that, with the right future 
case, and with Member Becker’s future participation, this long standing precedent of 
allowing cessation of dues check off may very well fall. 
 
 
4. MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002).  The successor bar rule. This 2002 
decision had overruled St. Elizabeth Manor, 329 NLRB 341 (1999). However, this case is 
now being reconsidered as a result of the Board granting of a request for review in UGL-
UNICCO Services, Co., 355 NLRB No. 155 (2010). The Board issued an invitation for 
briefs last August. 
 
In MV Transportation, 337 NLRB 770 (2002), the Board reversed 
the “successor bar” doctrine. Under the successor bar doctrine, once a successor 
employer’s obligation to recognize an incumbent union attached, the union was entitled 
8
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 24
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss6/24
 9 
to a reasonable period of time for bargaining without challenge to its majority status. St. 
Elizabeth Manor,Inc., 329 NLRB 341 (1999). In MV Transportation, the Board overruled 
St. Elizabeth Manor and held that “an incumbent union in a successorship situation is 
entitled to—and only to—a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status, which 
will not serve to bar an otherwise valid decertification, rival union, or employer petition, 
or other valid challenge to the union’s majority status. 
 
 
 
Other Cases and Invitation for Briefs  
 
 
 
1. Scope of bargaining units 
 
On occasion, the Board will solicit briefs from the public on pending cases. This 
approach is different from the “public comment” period that the Board must apply when 
engaged in formal rulemaking, but no less important. A request for briefs can signal a 
change in direction in Board case law where input from the public – in the form of legal 
briefs – is desired before the Board changes courses. And in some recent situations, the 
Board has called for briefs to help them interpret issues raised by particular cases. 
 
One area where this occurred was in the health care field. In the 1980s, the Board 
engaged in rulemaking in establishing presumptively appropriate bargaining units in 
acute health care facilities. Now, the Board has turned to long term care facilities, such as 
nursing homes. But rather than engage in rulemaking, it decided to invite briefs on a 
pending case that involves the determination of appropriate units for collective 
bargaining in long term care facilities. In Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, 
356 NLRB No. 56 (2010), the issue centered on whether a single unit limited to certified 
nursing assistants at one facility was appropriate, or, as the employer contended, the only 
appropriate unit was an larger unit of all nonprofessional employees at that facility. The 
case is still pending and the Board invited briefs from the public, over the dissent of 
Member Hayes, who expressed concern that Liebman, Becker and Pearce intended to use 
the case to overrule precedent or establish broadly applicable rules concerning 
determination of bargaining units. The briefing period closed on March 8 but was 
recently extended. 
 
While arising out of the health field, the call for briefs has raised larger questions 
as to whether the Board is establishing a different standard for assessing community of 
interest in all unit cases. Business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
have argued that NLRB should not depart from its traditional community of interest 
approach in favor of a standard that would allow a union to seek certification among any 
unit of employees performing the same work at the same facility without regard to 
whether there are other employees sharing a community of interest with the workers 
sought by a union. A case by case approach remains the preferred approach. 
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And indeed that has been the approach for non-acute facilities ever since Park 
Manor Care Center, 305 N.L.R.B. 872, (1991), where the Board held that in nonacute 
health care facilities it preferred to take a pragmatic or empirical approach to unit 
determinations that could include consideration of recurring factual patterns as well as 
traditional “community of interest factors.” The Park Manor board said “after various 
units have been litigated in a number of individual facilities, and after records have been 
developed and a number of cases decided from these records, certain recurring factual 
patterns will emerge and illustrate which units are typically appropriate.”  In the instant 
case, the Board now seeks input on such unit questions in nonacute care facilities. 
 
But the Board also asked broader questions in calling for briefs that drew a dissent 
from Member Hayes and vigorous comment from several organizations. The last two 
questions the board invited amicus filers to address were: 
 
(7) Where there is no history of collective bargaining, should the Board hold that 
a unit of all employees performing the same job at a single facility is 
presumptively appropriate in nonacute health care facilities? Should such a unit 
be presumptively appropriate as a general matter? 
 
(8) Should the Board find a proposed unit appropriate if, as found in American 
Cyanamid Co., 131 NLRB 909, 910 [48 LRRM 1152] (1961), the employees in 
the proposed unit are ‘readily identifiable as a group whose similarity of function 
and skills create a community of interest'? ” 
 
Hayes wrote that none of the parties in the Specialty Healthcare case sought the “broad 
inquiry” announced by the board, and he warned that “the notice and invitation to file 
briefs is a stunning initiative by my colleagues to consider replacing decades of Board 
law applying the community-of-interest standard with a test that will likely find that any 
group of employees who perform the same job in the same facility is an appropriate 
bargaining unit, without regard for whether the interests of the group sought are 
sufficiently distinct from those of other employees to warrant the establishment of a 
separate unit.” (See Daily Labor Report, BNA, March 11, 2011). 
 
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce weighed in on the unit issues in the case but was 
more concerned about the direction the Board was heading by posing the last two 
questions.  The Chamber also addressed the issues concerning the nonacute health care 
industry, but began its argument by noting that the Board's invitation in questions 7 and 8 
asked whether a bargaining unit should be considered presumptively appropriate in any 
industry if the unit includes only employees who performed a single job at a single 
facility. The Chamber expressed its concern that NLRB intends to consider its traditional 
position that the interests of employees in a unit sought by a petitioning union must be 
sufficiently distinct from those of other workers to justify the establishment of a separate 
unit and pointed to a dissent by Member Becker in Wheeling Island Gaming Inc, 355 
NLRB No. 127 (2010) that suggests such a direction. The Chamber, however, noted that 
Section 9(c)(5) of the NLRA provides that “[i]n determining whether a unit is 
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appropriate” for purposes of collective bargaining “the extent to which the employees 
have organized shall not be controlling.” 
  
The Board cannot, as suggested by Member Becker in Wheeling Island Gaming, 
comply with Section 9(c)(5) merely by pointing to some community of interest factors 
that are consistent with the extent of the union's organizing effort….. 
 
The Board should continue to consider whether the scope of a proposed unit is 
conductive to the bargaining that would follow certification and “should not, as 
Member Becker suggests, simply approve the narrowest unit sought by the 
petitioning labor organization and then leave it to the parties to reshape the unit” 
if they find that a different unit would be more manageable or practical. 
 
The Chamber also challenged the assertion that disputes over the scope of bargaining 
units have been delaying resolution of representation cases in the health care industry. 
Arguing that in health care and other industries the “overwhelming majority” of NLRB 
elections are conducted pursuant to employer-union stipulations or agreements within 
reasonable time frames, the chamber said “the data simply do not support the assertion 
that unit scope issues are delaying elections in this industry.” (Daily Labor Report, BNA, 
March 11, 2011 
 
 
2. Duty to Provide Witness Statements to Union 
 
Stephen Media and Hawaii Newspaper Guild, 356 NLRB No. 63 (2011).  
 
In that case, the Board had found employer violated the Act by failing to provide 
certain information to the union. But Board severed the question of whether the employer 
had a duty to provide a particular statement provided to it by an employee or other 
statements provided during the investigation of an employee’s alleged misconduct.  
 
On March 2, 2011, the Board called for an “Invitation to File Briefs” on this issue. 
The Notice and Invitation states: 
 
Board precedent establishes that the duty too furnish information “does not 
encompass the duty to furnish witness statements themselves.” Fleming Cos. 332 
NLRB 1086, 1087 (2000), quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 237 NLRB 982, 985 
(1978)…. This case illustrates, however, that Board precedent does not clearly 
define the scope of the category of “witness statements.” This case also illustrates 
that the Board’s existing jurisprudence may require the parties as well as judges 
and the Board to perform two levels of analysis to determine whether there is a 
duty to provide a statement: first asking if the statement is a witness statement 
under Anheuser-Busch and then, if the statement is not so classified, asking if it is 
nevertheless attorney work product. We have therefore decided to sever this 
allegation from the case and to solicit briefs on the issues it raises.  
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The questions raised were:  What is a witness statement? And if a statement is not 
a witness statement, is it nevertheless an attorney work product?  
 
By way of background, Board precedent establishes that the duty to furnish 
information to a union “does not encompass the duty to furnish witness statements 
themselves” that may be obtained by an employer during an investigation. Fleming Cos. 
332  NLRB 1086, 1087 (2000), quoting Anheuser-Busch, 237 NLRB 982, 985 (1978). In 
Anheuser- Busch, supra, there were two conditions precluding disclosure. The first is that 
the employee adopted the employer’s summary of his or her statement. Second, that 
assurances of confidentiality had been given to the employee.  The names of any 
witnesses must be given in any event. 
 
In Central Telephone of Texas, 343 NLRB 947 (2004), the Board noted that 
witness statements prepared in anticipation of litigation were protected under the work 
product privilege and did not have to be disclosed to a union. To qualify, the party 
directing the statement must have a reasonable belief that litigation was a possibility. 
 
   In California Nurses Assn., 326 NLRB 1362 (1998), it was held that a union is not 
entitled to pre-arbitration discovery.  However, in Ormet Aluminum Products, 335 NLRB 
788 (2001), the Board distinguished California Nurses in a case where the request for the 
statement was made at the grievance stage, not the arbitration stage. Since the grievances 
were not “pending arbitration,” it cannot be said the union was seeking pretrial discovery.   
 
In the Stephen Media case, the administrative law judge noted that, under the facts 
of that case, a witness statement had been made before there was even a decision on 
discipline cannot be construed as such a work product. Under those circumstances, the 
judge found that the statement of an employee made during the course of the 
investigation had to be disclosed. 
 
 
Actions of General Counsel: 
 
 The General Counsel’s Office can also be a source for subtle changes in the law 
under the Act and in recent months, Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has been 
aggressive in carving out some particular areas of concern and altering past Board 
practice in these areas. His GC Memoranda of particular note thus far follow. 
 
 
GC Memorandum 11-05. 
 
Regarding the Board’s standards for deciding whether to defer to an arbitration award 
as a resolution of an unfair labor practice charge.   
 
When conduct alleged as an unfair labor practice is also the subject of a grievance 
alleging that the conduct violated a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB has two 
concerns: 1) to carry out its statutory mandate to prevent unfair labor practices by 
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investigating and deciding the charge; 2) but on the other hand, to foster the statutory 
policy in favor of private resolution of disputes through the collective bargaining process. 
 
Under the Collyer doctrine, the Board implements both policies by suspending the 
processing of the unfair labor practice charge and awaiting the outcome of the grievance-
arbitration process. 
 
On occasion, grievants claim that although the arbitration resolved the contract claim, it 
did not properly deal with the unfair labor practice issues.  The Board’s Spielberg/Olin 
line of cases articulated a test for deciding whether to defer to the arbitration award. The 
Board will accept the arbitrable resolution of the statutory claim provided: 1) the 
contractual and statutory claims were  “factually parallel,” and 2) the facts relevant to the 
statutory claim were “presented generally” to the arbitrator and 3) the arbitrator’s award 
was not “clearly repugnant” to the Act or “palpably wrong.”  
 
General Counsel Lafe Soloman believed that these standards should be revisited. He 
indicated in his Memorandum that he will urge the Board to challenge the Spielberg/Olin 
standard and defer “only if the arbitrator or parties to the grievance settlement had the 
authority to, and did, consider the statutory claim. General Counsel would preserve the 
“clearly repugnant” aspects of the standard, however.  In particular, the Memorandum 
stated: 
 
In Section 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a)(3) statutory rights cases, the Board should no longer 
defer to an arbitral resolution unless it is shown that the statutory rights have been 
adequately considered by the arbitrator…. [the party seeking] deferral must 
demonstrate that : 1) the contract had the statutory right incorporated in it or the 
parties presented the statutory issue to the arbitrator; and 2) the arbitrator correctly 
enunciated the applicable statutory principles and applied them in deciding the 
issue. If the party urging deferral makes that showing the Board should defer 
unless the award is clearly repugnant, i.e. the arbitrator’s award is not susceptible 
to an interpretation consistent with the Act.” (GC Memorandum 11-05 at page 7) 
 
Additionally, the Memorandum directed before the Regions defer to arbitration under 
Collyer, they should take affidavits from the charging party and all witnesses within the 
control of the charging party before they make their “arguable merit’ determination.  
 
 
GC Memorandum 10-07 and 11-01 
 
Re effective remedies for unfair labor practices during union organizing campaigns 
 
Guidance by General Counsel that remedies for serious violations of the Act 
during campaigns be dealt with quickly, including the use of Section 10(j) injunctive 
relief. The type of cases to which this initiative is directed include: discharge or 
retaliation against key union activists; threats of discharge; threats of closure or other 
adverse consequences of employees support unionization, interrogation, and solicitation 
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of grievances and promise or grant of benefits. GC 11-01 in particular is premised on the 
principle that the impact of a nip-in-the-bud violation is not confined to the individual 
victim of the violation but resounds among all employees.  Remedies in these types of 
cases can include: 
 
 reading of a Notice of employee rights and cease and desist orders to 
assembled groups of employees 
 
 Access remedies. 
 
“Where an employer unlawfully interferes with communications between 
employees, or between employees and a union, the impact of that interference 
requires a remedy that will ensure free and open communication. Allowing 
union access to an employer’s bulletin board and providing the union with the 
names and addresses of employees will restore employee/union 
communication and assist the employees in hearing the union’s message 
without fear of retaliation.” (GC 11-01, page 8) 
 
NOTE: “Where an employer customarily uses electronic means to 
communicate to employees, “regions should submit to the division of advice 
on whether to seek a remedy including union access to those electronic means 
of communication.” J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (2010) 
 
GC 10-07 deals with Section 10 (j) injunctions and is designed to streamline that process 
and avoid duplicative efforts. 
 
 
GC Memorandum 11-06 
 
Re Remedies for first contract disputes 
 
General Counsel Solomon also gave regional offices more authority to seek 
additional remedies in unfair labor practice cases involving first contract bargaining. 
Remedies such as mandated bargaining schedules, extension of the certification year, and 
reimbursement to unions of negotiating costs can now be ordered by the regions without 
having to obtain advice from the Board’s Division of Advice. In addition, “notice-
reading” remedies can also be ordered by the regions without going through the Division 
of Advice. Solomon said he was authorizing the regions to seek notice reading remedies 
in first bargaining cases, depending on the facts, that might involve certain situations of 
outright refusal to bargain; where an employer rejected all of the union’s proposed 
bargaining dates; where an employer makes unilateral changes and refuses to provide 
information to the union; where there was bad faith bargaining and discrimination against 
union stewards, etc.  
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GC  Memorandum 11-07 
Re Back Pay issues 
In GC 11-07, Acting General Counsel urged reconsideration of two 2007 Board 
decisions that require illegally discharged employees to start looking for a new job within 
two weeks of being fired, and shifted the burden from the wrongdoer to the General 
Counsel to prove that they have diligently pursued work throughout the backpay period. 
Earnings from these other jobs are deducted from backpay awards. Earnings from these 
other jobs are deducted from backpay awards. Mr. Solomon directed officials in the 
agency’s 31 regional offices to identify cases in the field that could be used as vehicles to 
ask the Board to reconsider the 2007 decisions. The first of those decisions was 
Grosvenor Resort, 350 NLRB 1197 (2007), where the Board ruled that: 
If a discriminatee began a reasonably diligent search anytime within [a two week] 
period following discharge, then his or her backpay would run from the date of 
the Respondent’s unlawful action. If, however, a discriminatee failed to 
commence a search at some point within this two week period, then his or her 
backpay would not begin to accrue until the discriminatee commenced a proper 
job search. 
In St. George’s Warehouse, 351 NLRB 961 (2007), the Board ruled with respect to back 
pay issues: 
We reaffirm that a respondent has the burden of persuasion as to the contention 
that a discriminatee has failed to make a reasonable search for work. However, we 
reach a different conclusion with respect to a part of the burden of going forward 
with evidence. The contention that a discriminatee has failed to make a reasonable 
search for work generally has two elements: (1) there were substantially 
equivalent jobs within the relevant geographic area, and (2) the discriminatee 
unreasonably failed to apply for these jobs. Current Board law places on the 
respondent-employer the burden of production or going forward with evidence as 
to both elements of the defense. As to the first element, we reaffirm that the 
respondent-employer has the burden of going forward with the evidence. 
However, as to the second element, the burden of going forward with the 
evidence is properly on the discriminatee and the General Counsel who advocates 
on his behalf to show that the discriminate took reasonable steps to seek those 
jobs. They are in the best position to know of the discriminatee’s search or his 
reasons for not searching. Thus, following the principle that the burden of going 
forward should be placed on the party who is the more likely repository of the 
evidence, we place this burden on the discriminatee and the General Counsel.  
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GC Memorandum 11-08 
In this memo the General Counsel outlined new methods for calculating backpay 
hat includes daily compounded interest as recently ordered by the Board, and 
compensates for such things as expenses to search for employment and tax penalties for 
lump sum payments. This was designed to implement  Jackson Hospital Corporation 
d/b/a Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010), where the Board changed 
its policy with regard to the assessment of interest on make whole orders. Under the new 
policy, interest on make-whole awards is to be compounded on a daily basis, using the 
established methods for computing backpay and for determining the applicable rate of 
interest. This change was made in order to bring the National Labor Relations Board in 
line with other comparable legal regimes (including the Internal Revenue Code) and to 
better serve the remedial policies of the Act. In order to effectuate the change to daily 
compound interest, it is necessary to make changes to the manner in which backpay and 
other monetary awards are calculated. 
 
 
General Counsel’s views regarding initiatives in Four States on guaranteeing the right 
of employees within those states to a secret ballot election when deciding upon a union 
 Four states have enacted state constitutional amendments governing the method 
by which employees would choose union representation. Such amendments would 
require a secret ballot election in all cases, initiatives that were filed to head of the 
enactment of the Employee Free Choice Act. 
In January, the National Labor Relations Board advised the Attorneys General of 
Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah that those recently-approved state 
constitutional amendments governing the method by which employees choose union 
representation conflict with federal labor law and therefore are preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
The states were also advised that the Board has authorized the Acting General 
Counsel to file lawsuits in federal court, if necessary, to enjoin them from enforcing the 
laws. In letters to the attorney generals of each of those states, Acting General Counsel 
Lafe Solomon indicated that the NLRA provides two paths to union recognitions: one 
through the election process and the other through voluntary recognition of majority 
status. The state amendments prohibit the second method and therefore interfere with the 
exercise of a well-established federally-protected right. For that reason, they are 
preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.   The amendments have 
already taken effect in South Dakota and Utah, and are expected to become effective 
soon in Arizona and South Carolina. 
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All four attorney generals responded with a defense of their states’ constitutional 
amendments, and the ball is now back in the General Counsel’s office to determine what 
route he will take. 
 
 Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.) has introduced legislation (H.R. 1407) that would 
protect such state initiatives for secret ballots in union representation elections. His bill, 
the State Right to Vote Act, was introduced on March 11 and is now sitting in the House 
Education and Workforce Committee. 
 
The bill would amend the National Labor Relations Act by adding the following 
language: 
 
Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing or recognizing a labor 
organization as the representative of employees unless the labor organization has 
been selected by a majority of such employees in a secret ballot election 
conducted by the National Labor Relations Board in any state or territory in 
which such labor organization recognition is prohibited by state or territorial law 
unless recognition is accomplished through a secret ballot election conducted by 
the board. 
 
In addition, it would provide: 
No agency of the federal government may bring any challenge against a state 
statute or constitutional provision which protects the right of employees to choose 
labor organization representatives through secret ballot elections. 
 
 
Rulemaking:  
 
 The third method by which the Obama Board will move in the direction of labor 
will be through its power of rulemaking. The NLRB is authorized by statute to make 
rules and regulations to enforce the Act, and although little used in the past, this Board 
has already shown a propensity for using such powers. Chair Liebman has stated that 
“Rule making is something that certainly academics have been talking about for some 
time… I think it’s worth consideration.” Some examples of rule making activity thus far 
include: 
 
1. Required Posting of Rights under NLRA 
 
The Board has proposed that all employers be required to post a notice informing 
employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Public comment closed 
on February 22, after thousands submitted their views pro and con.  Opposition to the 
proposed rule centered on the Board’s lack of statutory authority to require notice 
postings by employers not specifically involved in NLRB proceedings. In addition, some 
argue that the concept of a Board notice is an antiquated concept, not needed in this age 
of Google and internet information.  One lobbying group said that a quick Google search 
of “forming a union” generated 17,000 hits – the first being an AFL-CIO posting on how 
to form a union in the workplace. 
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Those in favor argue that the rule requiring postings is within the Board’s 
authority and will assist employees. The NLRA is unique among federal labor laws in 
that it does not require such a posting within the statute itself, and union lobbying groups 
contended employees remain unaware of their rights in many cases. Further, such a 
posting of the law’s requirements would hardly be a serious burden for employers. 
 
 
2. “Members Only” Bargaining 
 
In August 2007, the United Steelworkers and six other unions filed a petition 
asking the Board to engage in rulemaking to recognize members only bargaining. The 
petition claims that nothing in the Act requires that a union representing employees must 
have a majority status, and that the purposes of the Act can be served by allowing 
employees to join together in labor organizations and be recognized by their employers, 
even if they do not constitute a majority.   In June 2010, forty six law professors sent a 
letter to the NLRB urging them to use internal rule making to allow for members’ only 
collective bargaining when a union does not have majority support.  
 
The Board Division of Advice had expressed its view during the Bush Board 
period that members only bargaining should not be required. In 2006, the NLRB’s 
Division of Advice issued a memorandum in Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case No. 6-CA-
34821, in which the Board’s general counsel determined that a complaint should not be 
issued on allegations that an employer unlawfully refused to bargain with an employee 
council that representing a minority of the company’s employees.  
 
 Whether this issue will now be revisited by the Board through rulemaking is a 
pending matter. 
 
 
3. Possible shortening of time between petition and election? 
In addition, recently appointed Board Member Mark Pearce gave a speech at 
Suffolk University Law School in Boston in October 2010 during which he foreshadowed 
some other potential changes through the NLRB’s rulemaking which could benefit 
unions.  One issue which Pearce discussed was the possible shortening of the time period 
between the filing of an election petition and an election.  While this change has not yet 
been made, Pearce’s comments on it demonstrate that the Board is interested in making 
changes to the legal landscape through its rulemaking process as well as its decisions.  
 Other issues that might be susceptible to rulemaking include the amount of 
information that must be provided to an organizing union. For example, the Excelsior list 
of names and addresses of unit employees prior to an election may be expanded to 
include email addresses of unit employees.  
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Employers should be alert to this shift by the NLRB towards a more pro-union 
agenda.  In particular, with the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”) seemingly 
remaining stagnant in Congress, there may be cause for concern that the NLRB could 
attempt to endorse significant portions of the EFCA through its rulemaking process 
instead of through the legislature. To some degree, the more aggressive stance by the 
General Counsel’s office on dealing with first contract violations and the suggestion that 
rulemaking might solve the problem of undue delays between petition and election are 
indicators that the Board may stretch as far as it can, within the bounds of statutory 
restrictions, to provide some of the union wish list items that sat in the EFCA package. 
 
Other Cases of Note from the Board 
 
 
Research Foundation of SUNY, 355 NLRB No. 170 (2010) 
 
 In this case, a petitioning union sought to represent the post-doctoral associates at 
the SUNY-Buffalo campus. The associates were technically employees of the Research 
Foundation of SUNY, a private educational foundation that serves as a fiscal agent for 
SUNY. In this regard, the Foundation administers the grant, hires the associates and sets 
their pay and benefits within the parameters of the grant. 
  
During the organizing campaign, a union organizer, Amy Melton, asked to visit 
one of the associates in his office. Upon hearing about this planned meeting, the manager 
of the Foundation checked with SUNY Human Resources to see whether he had to allow 
the meeting to take place. He was told he did not. Consequently, the manager confronted 
Ms. Melton in the office of the associate and told her that she had to leave since she was 
on private property and if she did not, she would be arrested. 
  
After the union lost the subsequent election (the tally was tied at 35-35), the union 
filed objections. The Board majority of Chair Liebman and Member Pearce explained: 
 
Objections 4 and 13 allege, collectively, that the Employer interfered with 
employees’ protected activity by “threaten[ing] to have Union agents arrested in 
or near the workplace, in such a manner as to interfere with employees’ rights to 
organize and support the Union.” In support of these objections, the Petitioner’s 
organizer testified that during her visit to the office of a unit employee to solicit 
his support for the Union, an Employer official told her to leave the building or he 
would call the police.  
 
 The Board began by citing the general rule under Lechmere decision is that 
nonemployee organizers, like Melton, are not entitled to engage in Section 7 organizing 
activity on the private property of others. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 
(1992).  However, the Board quickly added: 
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However, an employer has no right under Lechmere to exclude union 
representatives engaged in Section 7 activity from areas in which it lacks 
a property interest. Bristol Farms, 311 NLRB 437, 438 fn. 6 (1993) Therefore, as 
the judge correctly noted in citing Indio Grocery Outlet,4 the threshold question 
in cases such as this is whether the employer possessed a property interest 
entitling it to exclude the union representative(s) from the area where the 
proposed organizing activity was to occur.  
 
On the factual question of property rights, the Board noted that the employer was on state 
property, not property it owned. Second, there was no evidence of a lease between the 
employer and the State of New York (though the administrative law judge had called the 
employer a lessor). Further, the Board disagreed with the judge that the employer’s right 
to take action derived from a state guideline prohibiting union organizing by outside 
labor organizations on state property. While the State may have such a guideline to take 
action, the employer is not the State and could not assert rights under that guideline. 
Next, while the employer said he had been delegated the right to expel the union 
organizer on behalf of the state since he contacted SUNY’s Human Resources Director. 
The Board noted that, while there was discussion about whether the manager had to let 
Ms. Melton stay, there was no direct delegation by the Human Resources Director to the 
manager to enforce the state’s guidelines. 
 
 Given the fact that no property rights could be established, there was no basis for 
the manager to throw Ms. Melton out of the building. Once this was established, the 
Board had little difficulty in finding the conduct of the manager in throwing out the 
organizing and threatening arrest to be objectionable conduct. The Board overturned the 
decision of the ALJ, who had found no objectionable conduct, and ordered a new 
election. 
 
 Member Schaumber disagreed with the majority. He began by writing: 
 
I agree with the judge that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Employer 
engaged in objectionable conduct when one of its officials informed a trespassing 
union organizer, who was on the premises in violation of state regulations, that 
the organizer could not meet with an employee on the property during work 
hours. It simply cannot be said that this isolated directive had such a tendency to 
interfere with employee free choice that it could have affected the election results. 
Rather, as the judge found, both the employee and organizer had ample alternative 
opportunities to discuss the pros and cons of unionization prior to the election, 
and the incident was disseminated to no other employee. Contrary to my 
colleagues, therefore, I would adopt the judge’s overruling of the Union’s 
Objections 4 and 13, and certify the results of the election. 
 
Member Schaumber notes that the majority was so entranced by whether or not the 
employer had a property interest in the building (he felt that they did anyway) that it 
avoided confronting the real question, namely,  
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…whether the alleged objectionable conduct, taken as a whole, warrants a new 
election because it has “the tendency to interfere with the employees’ freedom of 
choice” and “could well have affected the outcome of the election.” Metaldyne 
Corp., 339 NLRB 352 (2003).  My colleagues, focused as they are on property 
interests not at issue, fail to explain how the directive to Melton to leave Sherman 
Hall could possibly have affected the election outcome. 
 
He noted that the employee involved and Melton did not even know each other, that the 
two could have met off site and that the Foundation manager did not tell the employee he 
could not engage in protected activity, but rather simply told an intruder to leave the 
building. 
  
 
 
Manhattan College, Case No. 2-RC-23543 (Region 2 decision involving adjuncts and 
religious institutions) 
 
 On January 10, 2011, the Regional Director for Region 2 issued a Decision and 
Direction of Election at Manhattan College in New York for a unit of “all individuals 
employed at part-time faculty with an adjunct academic rank who teach a minimum of a 
three (3) credit college degree level course for a full semester (or the equivalent hours of 
a semester length courses).”  
 
 This decision followed a complex hearing on the question of whether the NLRB 
should exercise jurisdiction over the Catholic college or whether Manhattan is a “church-
operated institution whose faculty are exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction under the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)   Catholic 
Bishop held that the Board could not assert jurisdiction over lay teachers in a church-
operated school because to do so would create a “significant risk” that First Amendment 
rights would be infringed. Two ways in which that could happen under Catholic Bishop 
were (1) the Board might infringe on religious freedom by inquiring into the good faith of 
assertions by clergy-administrators that action alleged to be unfair labor practices were 
mandated by the school’s religious creed; (2) the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction might 
require the Board to determine the terms and conditions of employment in order to define 
the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining for church-operated schools. 
 
 While Catholic Bishop centers on parochial schools, the Board has applied the 
case to educational institutions at all levels on a case by case basis. St. Joseph’s College, 
282 NLRB 65 (1986). Since then, the Board has declined jurisdiction over a school 
“whose purpose and function in substantial part are to propagate a religious faith.” Jewish 
Day School, 283 NLRB757 (1987); Nazareth Regional High School, 282 NLRB 763 
(1987)(school’s mission was “to transmit the teachings of Jesus Christ and His Church”). 
 
 The Board has asserted jurisdiction where the church involvement with the 
college not to a level where it “creates a significant risk of constitutional infringement.” 
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Livingstone College, 286 NLRB1308, 1309 (1987); University of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 
1663. 
 
 Applying these standards to Manhattan, the Regional Director found that the 
primary purpose of Manhattan is secular and not the propagation of a religious faith. The 
RD indicated that the College had asserted that it had no intention of imposing “Church 
affiliation and religious observance as a condition for hiring or admission, to set quotas 
based on religious affiliations, to require loyalty oaths, attendance at religious services, or 
courses in Catholic theology.”  There was a commitment to a continued relationship with 
the Christian Brothers but the College also affirmed its commitment to academic freedom 
and to institutional autonomy. 
 
 The role of adjunct faculty does not involve propagating religious faith in any 
way, and the RD stated that “[b]ecause adjunct faculty are not required to advance a 
religious mission in any way, exercising jurisdiction over the College will not have any 
‘potential effects’ leading to unconstitutional entanglement. 
 
 The Regional Director disagreed with the College’s argument that concluding that 
the college is not a church operated school within the meaning of Catholic Bishop based 
on factors that its religious activities are not compulsory and its educational activities do 
not include indoctrination is “a view of religious that the Board cannot endorse without 
imposing its own definition of approved faith in clear violation of the First Amendment.”  
The Regional Director said that such inquiries were part and parcel of examining the case 
in light of Catholic Bishop. 
 
The purpose of considering whether indoctrination, proselytizing or in the 
Supreme Court’s terminology, “propagation of a religious faith,” is part of a 
school’s purpose is because rules requiring faculty to propagate faith would 
require bargaining over such rules and their disciplinary consequences and, 
further, would require the Board to scrutinize an employer’s defense to unfair 
labor practice charges based on asserted enforcement of faith-based rules. 
 
The Regional Director noted that the D.C. Circuit has refused to endorse the 
Board cases asserting jurisdiction based on the Board’s test, and instead has ruled that an 
organization is exempted if it: 
 
1. Holds itself out to students, faculty, and community as providing a religious 
educational environment 
 
2. is organized as a non-profit; and  
 
3. is affiliated with, owned by, operated, controlled directly or indirectly by a 
recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is 
determined, at least in part, with reference to religion. University of Great Falls v. 
NLRB, 278 F. 3d 1335, 1343 (2002) 
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The Board has not adopted the D.C. Circuit test but the Regional Director indicated that, 
even if it did apply those tests, Manhattan would not be exempt.  While conceding points 
two and three, the RD said that the College does not hold itself out as providing a 
religious educational environment. 
 
 While a recent Trustee Report, the Sponsorship Covenant and the new Catholic 
Studies academic requirement would seem to point in the direction of exemption, the RD 
explained that the Trustees Report actually tries to disengage the educational scholarship 
work of the founder of the Order, De La Salle, from its roots in Catholic France of the 
17
th
 century.  Admissions brochures make reference to De La Salle “but not to the 
Church, religion or Catholicism,” and the De La Salle references are secular in nature. 
  
 Further, the College’s own Trustee Report indicates that forty years earlier, the 
College’s elimination of church control, adjustments to compulsory religious activities 
and lack of religious test for employment or admission made the College eligible for aid 
from New York State under the Bundy Law.  Similarly, the Introduction Booklet given to 
all potential hires states that the College “is neither controlled by the state of the Church 
and is, as such, an accredited institution of higher learning in New York State. The RD 
concluded: 
 
While the College may well be affiliated with the Church and take pride in its  
historical relationship with the Church, the College’s public representations 
clearly demonstrate that it is not providing “a religious educational environment” 
and therefore even under the D.C. Circuit test, the Board should exercise 
jurisdiction over the College. 
 
 
 
El Paso Electric Co., 355 NLRB No. 95 (2010) (Alleged direct dealing) 
 
 In this case, involving allegations of direct dealing with employees but the CEO 
of a company during contract negotiations, the facts were that negotiations were taking 
place in a particular office building downtown. There was a group of employee 
demonstrators outside the building in support of their union. The CEO Gary Hedrick 
happened to be arriving at a restaurant across the street from the demonstration with his 
wife and heard his name called. He stopped by the demonstration, quieted the crowd and 
told them he stopped to hear what their concerns were. One employee told him they were 
concerned about the company’s driver policy and that it was too ambiguous. Hedrick said 
he would check into it. The employee said if he could change the policy, he’d get a 
contract. During this confrontation, one of the union negotiators showed up and talked a 
bit with Hedrick. 
 
 Later the same employee who talked to Hedrick called him at his office and asked 
if he had looked into the policy. Hedrick said he had, and he agreed it was ambiguous. He 
told the employee that he had instructed his negotiators to tighten up the language. 
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 The Board majority of Liebman and Pearce found this to be direct dealing and 
undercutting the union. 
 
The established criteria for finding that an employer has engaged in unlawful 
direct dealing are “(1) that the [employer] was communicating directly with 
union-represented employees; (2) the discussion was for the purpose of 
establishing or changing wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment 
or undercutting the Union’s role in bargaining; and (3) such communication was 
made to the exclusion of the Union.” Permanente Medical Group, 332 NLRB 
1143, 1144 (2000), citing Southern California Gas Co., 316 NLRB 979 (1995).   
 
The Board found that, based on the cited facts, these three criteria were met. In contrast, 
Member Schaumber found insufficient evidence of an 8(a)(5) violation. 
 
The conduct at issue here falls far short of “[G]oing behind the back of the 
exclusive bargaining representative to seek the input of employees on a proposed 
change in working conditions.” Allied-Signal, Inc., 307 NLRB 752, 753 (1992). 
In Allied-Signal, for example, without even notifying the union, the employer 
formed an employee task force to discuss the limits on management’s proposed 
smoking ban and any penalties that might be imposed for violating it. And in 
General Electric Co., 150 NLRB 192, 195 (1964), cited by the majority, the 
employer used a broad-based direct marketing campaign to employees away from 
the bargaining table to promote support for its bargaining proposals and to 
disparage any conflicting proposals by their union bargaining representative.  
 
Nothing like that happened here. Instead, as would any good employer interested 
in the concerns of his employees, Hedrick took the time to listen to Enriquez’ 
inquiries and to respond to them. Since the inquiries concerned a subject of 
bargaining, Hedrick’s responses were brief and vague. In sum, Hedrick showed 
concern for an employee, not the subject of bargaining about which she inquired, 
which at all times remained exclusively within the province of the Union’s 
representatives to negotiate with the Respondent. Under these circumstances, 
Hedrick’s conduct surely did not undercut the Union’s role in bargaining. I would 
therefore dismiss the allegation that the Respondent engaged. 
 
 
  
American Med. Response of Conn., NLRB Reg. 34, No. 34-CA-12576, complaint 
issued 10/27/10) (Section 7 rights in the context of social media) 
Seizing on an issue that could affect nearly any employer with a blogging or 
social media policy, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), through one of its Regional Directors, recently issued a Complaint against an 
employer who terminated an employee, at least in part, for having posted on Facebook 
negative comments about her supervisor.  
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The case was scheduled to go to trial in January 2011, but AMR agreed to change 
the overly broad rules on employee communication under a settlement agreement 
approved by the Board. Under the settlement, the company agreed to revise its rules to 
ensure that they do not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours 
and working conditions with co-workers and others while not at work. 
The facts of the case were as follows: 
The employer had received a customer complaint regarding the employee’s work.  
The employee was allegedly called in by her supervisor to answer questions regarding the 
matter.  The NLRB Complaint states that when the employee requested union 
representation at the interview the employer refused, and threatened her with discipline 
for making the request.   
After returning home from work, the employee posted a negative comment 
regarding her supervisor on Facebook.  She allegedly then received supportive comments 
from some of her co-workers, and went on to post additional negative comments about 
her supervisor. 
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from discharging, 
disciplining, or otherwise discriminating against, an employee who engages in “protected 
concerted activity.”  Such activity generally includes discussions with co-workers as to 
wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.  The NLRB alleges that 
the employer fired the employee for posting the negative comments about the supervisor 
on Facebook, and that this is unlawful interference with protected, concerted employee 
activity.  The employer denied this, stating that the employee was discharged for multiple 
serious issues, not simply the negative posting. 
Of particular interest is the fact that the employer has a handbook containing 
policies that prohibit employees from certain kinds of blogging or internet postings.  
Among other things, the handbook bars employees from making “disparaging, 
discriminatory or defamatory comments when discussing the company or the employee's 
superiors, co-workers and/or competitors.”  The NLRB Complaint alleges that such a rule 
is unlawful on its face. 
This issue has unusually broad ramifications about employee use of internet social 
media and employer attempts to restrict that activity. The NLRB is typically considered a 
watchdog over union-management relations, but the National Labor Relations Act 
actually protects the right of all employees – union and non-union – to engage in 
“protected, concerted activity.”  The concept of protected, concerted activity includes 
employees simply discussing work-related issues, concerns or complaints, even in a 
completely non-union setting.  “Water cooler” chit-chat has become internet social media 
chit-chat.  If the NLRB rules that employees’ disgruntled discussions about supervisors 
via Facebook are under the umbrella of protected, concerted activity, then all employers, 
whether or not their employees are represented by a union, have to be concerned about 
how they react to and attempt to regulate employee activity on the internet.  This will 
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have implications for the specific contents of employee handbooks and policies already in 
place.  Until the case is decided, employers should be careful in drafting, promulgating 
and enforcing policies as to blogging, postings on social media sites, etc. 
  
Bannering 
 
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 355 NLRB No. 159 (2010), a 3-2  Board 
majority held that a union’s stationary “bannering” – as opposed to picketing – of a 
neutral employer was not unlawful secondary activity.  The case involved a primary 
dispute between a non-union employer and a union that wanted to represent its 
employees. The union displayed a large stationary banner on a public sidewalk near the 
entrance of a third party employer that said: “Shame [followed by the name of the neutral 
employer],” followed by the phrase “labor dispute.”   
  
General Counsel for the Board had argued that the posting individuals at or near 
the entrance of the secondary employer’s facilities to hold banners declaring that a labor 
dispute existed constituted picketing and was coercive. Secondly, the banners were 
coercive because they contained fraudulent wording that would lead one to believe the 
dispute was with the neutral employer. 
 
 Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization: 
 
(ii) to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce where an object thereof is – 
(B) forcing or requiring any person to .. cease doing business with any other  
person.” 
 
 
 The Board ruled otherwise. The Board noted first that Congress adopted this 
provision with the objective of shielding unoffending employers from improper pressure 
intended to induce them to stop doing business with another employer with whom the 
union has a dispute. But according to the majority, the focus of Congress was on 
picketing as a pressure tactic by unions. 
 
The Board then explained that the Act does not define “picketing.” The Board 
stated that, through case law, picketing has usually involved “persons carrying picket 
signs and patrolling back and forth before an entrance to a business or worksite.” 
Bannering does not meet that definition. 
 
The banner displays here did not constitute such proscribed picketing because 
they did not create confrontation. Banners are not picket signs. Furthermore, the 
union representatives held the banners stationary, without any form of patrolling. 
Nor did the union representatives hold the banner in front of any entrance to a 
secondary site in a manner such that anyone entering the site had to pass between 
the union representatives. The banners were located at a sufficient distance from 
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the entrances so that anyone wishing to enter or exit the site could do so without 
confronting the banner holders in any way. 
 
 
In short, the Board found that the display of a stationary banner, like handbilling, 
is noncoercive conduct falling outside of the Act’s prohibitions. The bannering lacked the 
confrontational aspect that is involved in picketing.  
 
The dissent noted that the majority had taken a narrow view of picketing based on 
sketchy legislative history, and that the bannering in this case clearly was proscribed. 
 
 This decision was followed up by Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters 
(New Star General Contractors), 356 NLRB No. 88 (February 4, 2011) where the Board, 
citing its earlier ruling, decided that similar large banners used to “shame” neutral 
employers into stop doing business with an employer with whom the union had a primary 
dispute was not violative of the Act. The General Counsel claimed that the bannering was 
a signal to the employees of the neutral employer to stop work.  But the Board said that 
without further evidence that the banners were intended by the union to be a “signal” to 
stop work, the Board could not find a violation.  
 
Member Hayes dissented saying that the bannering was “the confrontational 
equivalent of picketing.”  
___________________________________________________  
 
 
Parexcel International, 356 NLRB No. 82 (2011) (Preemptive Discharge Violates Act) 
 
 In Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82 (January 28, 2011), the Board held 
that an employer violated the Act by terminating an employee in order to prevent that 
employee from engaging in protected activity.  
 
 In this case, a registered nurse spoke with a recently rehired employee from South 
Africa about whether he and his wife had received inducements to return to work. The 
employee, falsely, said yes, he had received a raise to come back. The nurse then went to 
her supervisor and claimed that entire unit should quit and then come back with a raise.  
The nurse also stated that the manager whom she believed approved the raise and who 
was also South African, looked after employees from that country. 
 
 When questioned by management, the nurse admitted she has raised these points 
to her immediate supervisor but noted she has not talked to any other employees about it.  
 
 About a week later the nurse was terminated. She filed charges claiming she was 
terminated for engaging in protected activity.  At the hearing, the ALJ found that she had 
not engaged in protected activity, and the Board agreed. However, even though the 
employee had not engaged in such activity, the Board majority found that the employee 
was terminated because of the employer’s concern that she might in the future discuss 
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favoritism with regard to wages and preferential treatment for South Africans. The 
employer, the Board majority of Liebman and Becker said, was trying to “nip in the bud” 
future concerted activity. This was a violation of the Act.  
 
If an employer acts to prevent concerted protected activity – to nip in the bud—
that action interferes with and restrains the exercise of Section 7 rights and is 
unlawful without more 
 
 
While the Board majority could cite no cases in support, it did opine that other cases have 
found employer’s guilty of violating the Act when the employer believed an employee 
was engaged in protected activity even though he was not. See for example Metropolitan 
Orthopedic Assn., 237 NLRB 427 (1978). 
 
What is critical in these cases is not what the employee did but rather the 
employer’s intent to suppress protected concerted activity 
 
 
 
 
 
Court Decisions 
 
Pye v. The Longy School of Music (Injunctive Relief for Failure to Bargain Under 
NLRA) 
 
 In Pye v. The Longy School of Music,  -- F. Supp. --, 2011 WL 18872 (D.Mass., 
2011), the federal district court ruled that the Longy School of Music did not owe a duty 
to bargain over the restructuring of its faculty in furtherance of its plan to cancel its 
undergraduate program and merge with another institution. However, the school was 
required to bargain over how it would decide to layoff or reassign faculty, whom it would 
decide to layoff or reassign, whether those faculty would be given a second chance to 
adjust to the new model, and what would happen with the employees who were to be laid 
off and reassigned.  
 
 The court ruled that the balance of hardships caused by the private school’s 
unilateral terminations and reassignments of faculty tipped in favor of a preliminary 
injunction compelling the school to reinstate terminated faculty with pay. 
 
 In this case, the regional director moved for preliminary injunctive relief under 
section 10 (j) of the National Labor Relations Act and such relief was granted. 
 
 The school had been explored its long term future when in early 2010, its faculty 
unionized. The union was certified on February 1, 2010. On March 5, the President met 
with faculty as a whole to layout a strategic plan that included a merger with Bard 
College, a reorganization of the Conservatory and CP divisions of the school and the 
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phasing out of the undergraduate program among other items. When asked why the union 
was not involved in the strategic planning, the President said that “this is not business as 
usual, we still have management rights. This is outside the normal course of business. We 
are in a recession and that’s why I am making the decisions.”  
 
 On March 8, the union requested bargaining on the impact of the changes 
announced. The administration and union did meet and Longy told the union that the 
changed affected “big picture management issues” that affected non-union employees as 
well, and therefore a meeting with a subsection of faculty before the March 5 meeting 
would have been inappropriate.  It also indicated, however, that the changes were not to 
be made until the end of the year and that Longy still had a duty to bargain over their 
effects. 
 
 On March 11, Longy sent notices to all faculty about their status. Eight unit 
members were told their contracts would not be renewed.  Thirty three others were 
divisionally reassigned. Five chairs were relieved of their duties.  Each letter invited the 
faculty member to contact the administration if they had questions. 
 
 In addition, Longy made changes to health insurance benefits. Coverage was 
switched from Harvard Pilgrim to Blue Cross, with slightly less generous benefits (some 
co-pays were increased) but there was also a reduction in premiums.  
 
 In the months that followed, collective bargaining did occur but without much 
progress. The union claimed that the school was not bargaining in good faith; the school 
claimed the union failed to submit a complete proposal and wanted to bargain over non-
mandatory subjects.  Charges were eventually filed and on October 13, 2010, the Region 
issued a Complaint, asserting violations of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) by terminating 
employees; changing job assignments; changing health insurance carriers and benefits; 
and other related changes, as well as allegedly threatening faculty with termination if they 
were not loyal to the school. 
 
 The Region moved for injunctive relief to reinstate the eight unit members and 
other relief. 
 
 In analyzing this case, the Court reviewed the injunction standard of “likelihood 
of success on the merits.” 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address Longy’s assertion that faculty 
restructuring occurred before the Union was certified and thus before Longy was 
required to bargain. This would be a much closer case if Longy had already made 
specific plans to change employment policies but had yet to formally announce 
them before the union election. By the time the Union was on the scene, the 
school had certainly begun to consider faculty restructuring but it has yet to settle 
on the number of faculty it hoped to terminate or reassign or the specific criteria it 
would use in deciding which faculty to terminate.  
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But the Court went on to say: 
 
But this does not mean the Longy necessarily had a duty to bargain over all of its 
decisions. Specifically, even if the NLRB could establish that the concrete 
decision to move towards a core faculty modeled post-dated the Union’s election, 
Longy would not owe a duty to bargain over this broad, structural change. In First 
National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court…. 
described a trio of categories of management decisions that might affect the terms 
and conditions of employment. First are those decisions like “advertising and 
promotion, product type and design, and financing arrangements which have only 
an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship.” Management 
within its entrepreneurial discretion had the authority to make these changes 
without first bargaining with a union. Second, are those those decisions “such as 
the order of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules 
which are almost exclusively an aspect of the relationship between employer and 
employee. These kinds of decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining as long 
as the “benefit of labor management relations and the collective bargaining 
process does not outweigh the burden placed on the conduct of the business. 
These decisions involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise are 
akin to the decision as to whether to be in business at all not itself primarily about 
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to 
terminate employment. 
 
The Court went on to say that Longy’s decision to move to a core faculty model 
falls within that third category. It was a fundamental shift in the way the school did 
business.  The decisions to restructure its faculty and take other structural steps were 
‘harmonized with its plans to cancel its undergraduate program and merge with another 
institution. They were more analogous to a plant manager’s decision to begin 
manufacturing a different product than a decision to subcontract work to a new set of 
employees in order to reduce labor costs. 
 
 Additionally, the court said, “the burdens of bargaining over the decision to move 
to a core faculty would outweigh any marginal benefit for employees and the Union.”  
This decision was not about labor costs; it was as key component in a long term vision 
for changing the institution.”  Further, forcing Longy to bargain over its decision would 
significantly abridge its freedom to manage the academic business of the school. 
 
 But despite Longy’s prerogative to pursue faculty restructuring, it did have a duty 
to bargain over the effects of this decision, and the effects of the decision to restructure 
may have included specific changes to the employment contracts of Longy’s employees. 
The question of whether the school had to terminate a certain number of faculty could 
certainly have been amenable to collective bargaining.  
 
 Here, while Longy said it was bargaining over effects, it never made a serious 
proposal affecting those faculty who had been terminated or reassigned and it presented 
decisions about individual employees as non-negotiable.  
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Longy was entitled to develop a plan to restructure its faculty without consulting 
the union. But it was required to place a number of other issues on the bargaining 
table. These included how it would decide to layoff or reassign faculty; whom it 
would decide to layoff or reassign; whether these faculty would be given a second 
chance to adjust to the new model; and what would happen with the employees 
that would be laid off and reassigned. 
 
Having found a likelihood of success on these issues, the Court turned to the matter of 
irreparable harm for purposes of deciding the injunction issue. While noting that the 
Court did not believe it was in “any better position to repair the harm caused by Longy’s 
alleged unilateral changes to employee health benefits than an ALJ will be a few months 
from now,” it noted that the changes announced in March 2010 have had a much more 
substantial impact on collective bargaining and how employees perceive the union. 
 
The issue here is not just the harm to individual employees but the way that 
Longy’s changes impacted collective bargaining, an especially important 
consideration because the union and Longy had yet to negotiate a first collective 
bargaining agreement…. While the union represents the interests of the faculty 
during this tumultuous period, it should have all the advantages it is owed under 
the law, including the employment of terminated faculty who will be impacted by 
Longy’s plans. 
 
Independent of the harm to the bargaining process, Longy’s actions have 
potentially impacted the union’s standing among Longy’s faculty. The Board cites 
a number of examples to argue that Longy’s unilateral changes likely 
compromised the union’s “prestige and legitimacy” among Longy’s employees. 
[cites omitted]. This concern is heightened in this case because of the union’s 
recent election. National labor policy recognizes the precariousness of union 
support during the first year after its certification. [cites omitted] Some form of 
preliminary relief is warranted in order to stave off further erosion of union 
support. 
 
The Court ordered Longy to reinstated terminated faculty until Longy and the union 
bargain to an impasse over the effects of the decision to restructure the faculty. The 
school was not required to give them any specific assignments or recreate chair positions. 
But it was required to pay terminated faculty the salary they would have been receiving. . 
 
  
Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, (Applying Supreme Court’s decision in 14 
Penn Plaza) 
 
In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency,(10
th
 Cir. Ct Appeals, No. 09-1233 
(March 16, 2011), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employee who 
arbitrated and lost his arbitration case claiming national origin discrimination may still 
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bring his case to court, despite the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. 
Pyett, 129 S.Ct.1456 (2009).  
 
The plaintiff, John Mathews, was represented by a union. He was demoted from 
his role as supervisor after allegations that he had made inappropriate remarks to a female 
co-worker. He claimed he himself was discriminated against because of his national 
origin (Indian) and that he was retaliated for filing prior complaints over discrimination.  
The relevant portion of the collective bargaining agreement governing his grievance read: 
 
The Employer and the Union acknowledge continuation of their policies of no 
discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of age, sex, race, 
religious beliefs, color, national origin or disability in accordance with and as 
required by applicable state and federal laws. 
 
After a multi-day arbitration, an arbitrator denied his grievance. The arbitrator 
explicitly reviewed the discrimination claim and ruled that although he had made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas standards, he had failed to 
show that the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for demotion were 
pretextual.  
 
Mathews brought suit under Title VII. At the district court level, the court said 
that because the union contract had an anti-discrimination clause that covered his 
statutory claims, then his submission to arbitration effectively waived his right to sue in 
court.  
 
 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S.36 
(1974), the Court held that simply because he lost his contract discrimination claim in 
contract arbitration does not mean he cannot pursue the statutory claim of discrimination 
in court. In its ruling, the court distinguished 14 Penn Plaza from Gardner Denver and 
the facts of this case. 
 
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court explained [in 14 Penn Plaza], denied 
preclusive effect to a prior arbitral decision “because the collective bargaining 
agreement did not cover statutory claims.” Id at 1467. It therefore followed that 
the Gardner-Denver arbitrator could not decide questions of “statutory rights” 
regardless of whether the plaintiff’s “contractual rights” [were] similar to, 
duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII.” Id.  This jurisprudence 
remained sound, but does not “control the outcome where… the collective 
bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and 
contractual discrimination claims.” Id. At 1469 (emphasis added). Because the 
collective bargaining agreement in 14 Penn Plaza did expressly cover statutory 
claims, Gardner-Denver had no bearing and the terms of the arbitration agreement 
controlled. 
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Here, however, the anti-discrimination clause did not explicitly embrace statutory claims 
to a degree sufficient to provide preclusive effect.  
 
Although the parties acknowledged that violations of statutory law would also 
constitute violations of the contract, this does not mean that the CBA covered 
statutory claims or that the parties believed it to do so. Indeed, the district court’s 
conclusion ignored the “distinctly separate nature” of contractual and statutory 
rights, which is “not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the 
same factual occurrence.” Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 50. This reasoning does 
not change even though the contours of the CBA’s anti-discrimination protections 
were defined by reference to federal law. Rather, unionized employees of the 
Agency subjected to discriminatory treatment hold two similar claims, one based 
in statute and one based in contract. The operative question remains whether the 
CBA’s arbitration provisions are broad enough to encompass Mathew’s statutory 
claims, such that his submission to arbitration operated as a waiver of forum or 
election of remedy. 
 
Applying Supreme Court precedent to the facts of Mathews’s case, it is evident 
that no waiver of judicial forum has occurred…. Because the arbitration 
agreement empowered the arbitrator to resolve only the dispute submitted, and 
because the dispute submitted made no mention of statutory claims, the arbitral 
decision could in no way determine the question of Mathews’ statutory rights. 
Appropriately, the Agency’s representative at arbitration agreed that the issue 
before the arbitrator was whether “the company discriminated against Mr. 
Mathews in violation of Section 11, Article II of the contract, and the arbitral 
decision phrased the question decided strictly in terms of Mathews’ contractual 
rights under the CBA: “Did the Grievant’s demotion violate the contractual 
provisions prohibiting discrimination?”  
 
 
Some other state level cases of interest  
 
Portland State University Chapter of AAUP v. Portland State University, 240 Ore. 
App. 108, Ore. App. LEXIS 1657 (December 29, 2010).  Detailed case involving 
application of Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza v Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 
(2009). In this case, the grievance procedure failed to incorporate the statutory law, as 
required by the Supreme Court’s decision in order for the arbitration clause to preclude 
the individual from agency or court filing. 
 
__________________________________________________ . 
 
In re Rosenberg, 2010 WL 3259740 (Vt., 2010), a unionized adjunct professor 
claimed the Vermont State Colleges discriminated against her because of her protected 
activity when it failed to assign her courses for a given semester. In addition, the union 
alleged that the collective bargaining agreement was not followed in making such 
assignments. 
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The Vermont Supreme Court, affirming a Vermont Labor Relations Board 
finding, stated that the grievant and union failed to demonstrate that her protected activity 
of filing grievances was a motivating factor in the failure to assign her courses under the 
collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that an employer’s knowledge of an 
employee’s protected activity is not enough to infer discriminatory motive for purposes 
of a retaliation claim.  There must be clear nexus between the activity and the adverse 
action, and this is the employee’s burden.  
 
Despite the fact that the nonassignment of courses occurred after grievant filed 
several grievances, she produced no evidence from which the labor board or this 
Court could infer discriminatory motive.  
 
Further, despite the union’s claim that the contract required strict adherence to 
seniority when assigning adjuncts to introductory courses, the Court noted that the union 
contract provided no such rule. The contract stated that seniority shall govern 
assignments only when all other factors, including relative qualifications, were equal. All 
course assignments were subject to this standard. Any claim of oral understandings to the 
contrary that were allegedly made during bargaining were irrelevant in light of the clear 
contract language.. The collective bargaining agreement was unambiguous as to the right 
of the College to consider relative qualifications and not just seniority in assigning all 
courses to adjunct faculty. Thus, any assignment issue must be analyzed under such 
language. The College’s judgment to assign other adjuncts to courses instead of the 
grievant, despite her seniority, was reasonable under such contract standards. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
In Mitchell v. University Medical Center, (W.D. Ky, No. 3:07-cv-00414, August 
9, 2010), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky ruled that a nurse 
who talked about her Christian faith with fellow employees and described her 
calculations regarding the date for the end of the world cannot proceed with a Title VII 
claim of religious discrimination. 
 
 In this case, the employee, Claudette Mitchell, worked as an operating room nurse 
at the Medical Center at the University of Louisville. She claimed that she read a certain 
passage in the Bible and that when she did, she knew that God had told her to read other 
passages in order to calculate certain future events. In doing so, she said that it became 
clear to her that the date of December 21, 2033 would either mark the appearance of the 
Antichrist, or the end of the world. She became to share this information with her fellow 
employees, some of whom told her to stop because she was scaring them. Employees 
complained to her supervisor, telling her that Ms. Mitchell was plotting the end of the 
world; that they were uncomfortable with her discussions. Others were simply concerned 
about her well-being. Eventually, her supervisor told Mitchell not to discuss religion at 
work and told her that if it continued, she would be subject to discipline. 
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 Mitchell said she would resign. She said she was being singled out because other 
employees discuss their religion at work.  She did in fact leave, despite efforts by the 
hospital to have her stay if she would temper her remarks. She later filed charges 
claiming discrimination. 
 
 While recognizing that an employer has a duty to accommodate someone’s deeply 
held religious beliefs, the Court noted that her religious accommodation claim had to fail 
her because the hospital could not reasonably accommodate her conflict without undue 
business hardship. Her conversations with employees were offensive and troubling to 
them and any accommodation of her behavior necessarily would infringe on the rights of 
other workers. Further, there was no real harassment of her because of her religion since 
all that occurred was a directive from her supervisor to stop talking about religion. No 
one degraded her or insulted her because of her religion. 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
In Maine Community College System and Maine State Employees Association, 
SEIU Local 1989, (Case no. 10-UDA-01, 2010), the Maine Labor Relations Board ruled 
that a proposed bargaining unit of “all adjunct faculty members employed by the Maine 
Community College System who teach credit courses” was appropriate for bargaining. 
The Board rejected the employer position that such adjunct faculty were not “regular 
employees” under the Act because they did not occupy a “position” or discretely 
identifiable slot to be funded, budgeted or tracked.” The Board said: 
 
Whether a particular adjunct faculty is employed semester by semester or whether 
a particular course is offered from semester to semester has nothing to do with 
whether the position of “adjunct faculty member” exists on a continual basis – it 
merely reflects the needs of the college and the number of individuals who are 
employed and in the bargaining unit during any given semester. 
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